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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Corporate governance has received much attention globally, especially after numerous 
accounting scandals and failures that involve large companies throughout the world.  
Numbers of previous studies have been conducted in examining the association of 
corporate governance with firm performance. This study examines the role of board 
of directors and ownership structures towards firm performance in Dubai. This study 
is being tested on 79 listed companies in Dubai for year 2014.   
 
The results of this study show that independent directors and foreign ownership 
structure influence the firm performance as measured by ROA and ROE.  In addition, 
the results show that firm size is positively significant to firm performance either 
ROA or ROE. However, there are no significant relationship between board size and 
firm performance.  Similarly, GCC and Arab ownership structures, which are 
insignificant in this relationship.   
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ABSTRAK 
Urustadbir syarikat telah mendapat perhatian di seluruh dunia terutamanya selepas 
kegagalan dan skandal perakaunan yang melibatkan banyak syarikat-syarikat besar di 
seluruh dunia.  Banyak kajian telah dilakukan bagi menilai hubungan di antara 
urustadbir syarikat dan prestasi syarikat.  Kajian ini memeriksa peranan pengarah-
pengarah syarikat dan struktur pemilikan terhadap prestasi syarikat di Dubai.  Kajian 
ini dilakukan terhadap 79 syarikat yang disenaraikan di Bursa Dubai bagi tahun 2014. 
 
Hasil kajian menunjukkan, pengarah bebas dan pemilikan saham asing mempengaruhi 
prestasi syarikat apabila diukur menggunakan ROA dan ROE.  Tambahan, saiz 
syarikat menunjukkan keputusan signifikan terhadap prestasi syarikat samada melalui 
ROA atau ROE.  Walaubagaimanapun, tidak ada hubungan yang signifikan di antara 
saiz lembaga pengarah dengan prestasi syarikat.  Begitu juga, struktur pemilikan bagi 
GCC dan Arab, yang mana hubungannya adalah tidak signifikan. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Due to the precarious and unpredictable business environment, the regulating and 
governing of both the internal and external factors that are affecting firms’ 
performance become rather challenging (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Kuratko & Morris, 
2003). Parallel to globalization and the ever increasing firm growth, the need of 
business governance to enhance firm performance is recognized globally (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). These modifications attract investors who have already lost market 
trust to wisely make investment decision (Sunday, 2008). When a firm’s corporate 
governance (CG) strategy pertaining to its performance is mediocre, its market and 
business are likely to fail (Chen, 2008). Latest financial crises have recalled their 
attention to business governance and it is acknowledged that companies possessing 
better corporate governance structures signs better performance (Chiang, 2005). 
 
To attain financial supports from stakeholders, global businesses need to develop and 
evolve (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). Before involving in a given business, investors need 
to be assured that the financial stability and security are secured and that the business 
is profitable in the long term (Mallin, 2007). However, if the firm is not in a favorable 
position, the investor too will not be interested. Likewise, if a business fails to attain 
the sufficient amount of capital needed for its business to prosper, the business will be 
negatively affected and as a result, the whole economy is general is also affected 
(Chen, Elder & Hsieh, 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004; 
Sunday, 2008). 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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